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By Jana Sedlakova and Michael Wee, Postdoctoral researchers.

 

The freedom to ask questions and to pursue intellectual inquiry is a cornerstone of academic research, whatever the disciplinary background or method. Asking difficult questions is a responsibility of researchers. Scientific research is often held to be valuable even if its political or practical relevance is not immediately obvious. Many important discoveries have emerged from curiosity-driven inquiry rather than societal demand, especially in more theoretical areas like pure mathematics or fundamental physics. Limiting academic freedom would appear to be incompatible with the purpose of academia itself, as it may unknowingly hinder scientific discoveries. 

A similar principle applies to argument-based scholarship in the humanities and the social sciences. As part of this commitment to academic freedom, universities are often expected to foster the conditions where disagreement, controversial positions, and politically unpopular research are able to occur, and to remain independent from external pressure and commercial interests.

This becomes especially relevant in recent debates around cancel culture and ideological conformity within academia. Many would agree that academics should not be denied the possibility to present findings or participate in academic discussions even when their views go against prevailing political opinions or established social norms. Should there be limits and conditions attached to these discussions? Should researchers ever be prevented from speaking at a university on views that run counter to the majority? Restricting certain topics or excluding controversial researchers risks turning universities into spaces of intellectual conformity rather than open inquiry and can arguably diminish academia itself.

At the same time, freedom of speech is not freedom from consequence, and there are wider ramifications for unrestricted academic freedom. For example, a public lecture about a controversial topic or view on pandemic-related issues can unnecessarily lead to decreased public trust and anxiety in society.

In reality, academia already operates through forms of censorship, selection and prioritisation. Funding, institutional attention, research time, and public interest are all limited resources. Some topics receive support because they are judged worthy of serious scientific study, while others are considered less pressing, deemed offensive or unworthy of serious inquiry and so therefore not prioritised.

Arguably, the real question is therefore not whether prioritisation and consequently exclusion of topics should exist, but whether universities should develop clearer norms for such prioritisation. The question of authority and representation becomes central to this endeavour, as different disciplinary viewpoints need to be taken into account. Who has the authority to speak on behalf of a particular research community, and what if different disciplines or schools of thought clash in what they consider worthy of serious study? Some will argue that these difficulties are not insurmountable, while others will see any such exercise as an ominous attack on academic freedom.

Arguments in favour

Arguments against

Academic Standards
Some topics fall outside the boundaries of serious academic inquiry. Astrology, for instance, does not align with accepted standards of evidence, explanation, and reproducibility. Universities should not have Astrology Departments (though social scientists and historians can study astrology as a social phenomenon). This is not censorship, but a defence of the scientific method. We cannot take academic freedom seriously if we begin by pre-judging what serious academic inquiry is and what is not. While some examples are clear-cut for almost everybody, there are other fields which have shifted or are still shifting across the serious-nonsense border, e.g., theology, metaphysics, psychiatry. Therefore, we should acknowledge that our perspective on what counts as serious inquiry is limited by our current state of knowledge and values, and we should take a principled stance that academic freedom is non-negotiable. 
Norms for prioritisation
Resources in universities – research time, funding, interest – are always limited, so prioritisation and exclusion already take place. This process can and should be made more transparent by having clearer norms for prioritisation.  Different disciplines have different norms for legitimacy and prioritisation, and sometimes disciplines are incommensurable. To call for clearer norms may result in an unfeasible and unproductive standardisation, where, e.g. humanities research becomes subject to scientific notions of objectivity, thereby suppressing creative or boundary-pushing research.
Social hype
Certain topics are driven by social hype and end up saturating the field of discussion because they attract media attention and public fascination, and not because they are serious scientific problems. AI and consciousness may be one example of a topic that is ultimately speculative, conceptually unclear, and unfalsifiable. Academics should resist hype and not reproduce it; they should instead aim to cover a range of important topics that are balanced, diverse, and unbiased. Even if some topics are driven by social hype, we should be careful to avoid stigmatising such research just because it is trendy. It is an important tenet of academic research that it is independent of social and political pressure. While well-intentioned, caution against social hype may end up posing extra barriers or even taboos, especially in a period where academic research is already under intense public scrutiny. 
Unethical research
The study of certain topics is unethical and universities should empower academics to take a clear moral stance against such research, e.g., on race and intelligence. Even if certain topics are deemed unethical, academics should be able to confront them openly and subject them to robust proof or justification that the topics are indeed immoral. This will strengthen social norms.
Unwanted legitimacy
Discussing a particular topic or viewpoint, even if only to mount a critique of it, already gives it some sort of legitimacy, as something to be taken seriously. By contrast, not talking about something expresses a stronger, more principled standpoint against an immoral or nonsensical topic. By restricting discussion on particular topics or viewpoints, universities may end up reinforcing them by pushing them into extreme echo chambers. These positions may become seen as legitimate because they are deliberately suppressed.

 WHAT DO YOU THINK?