Contemporary societies increasingly confront deep and persistent moral disagreements that are resistant to resolution through standard dialogue or democratic processes. Despite extensive philosophical analysis of moral disagreement, existing work has insufficiently explored the complexity of these disagreements as social and cultural phenomena. This article introduces and elaborates the concept of radical moral disagreement (RMD), characterising it through seven defining features—including incompatible values, entrenched positions, emotional intensity, and contested epistemologies—that distinguish RMD from ordinary moral disagreements. Drawing on examples such as abortion debates, climate policy conflicts, and pandemic responses, the authors develop a conceptual framework for understanding the nature, dynamics, and consequences of RMD. They argue that while such disagreements may destabilise social cohesion and governance, they also have the potential to catalyse moral progress if properly understood. The paper outlines key research questions spanning philosophy, sociology, psychology, and media studies to advance scholarly engagement with RMD and to inform practical approaches for coexistence in pluralistic, highly polarised contexts.
Lyreskog D, Wilkinson D, A. Atuire C et al. The Problem (and the Value) of Radical Moral Disagreement [version 1; peer review: 3 approved]. Wellcome Open Res 2025, 10:495 (https://doi.org/10.12688/wellcomeopenres.24721.1)