Enlarging Reason: Reasoning and Radical Value Disagreements
Monday, 19 October 2026 to Monday, 9 November 2026
St Cross College, 61 St Giles', Oxford OX1 3LZ. The Large Seminar Room.
Weekly seminar series held in the Michaelmas Term 2026, exploring what counts as good reasoning and argumentation.
EVENT DESCRIPTION
In philosophy, ethics, and associated disciplines, we tend to assume that there is a broadly shared standard of what counts as good reasoning and argumentation. This enables meaningful and rational debate on topics about which there is a wide range of opposing views. However, this assumption has at times been called into question, notably in relation to radical disagreements over moral, political and cultural matters (which we broadly term ‘radical value disagreements’), but also in the philosophy of science, where the term 'paradigm shift' was first popularized.
For instance, some have suggested that our reasons and arguments proceed from rival premises, worldviews, or paradigms—and crucially, there seems to be no obvious rational process from choosing between our starting points. Furthermore, reasoning may operate differently within each paradigm or worldview. Some worldviews may favour a stricter view of reasoning, e.g. focusing on inferential links and propositions, while others may take a broader view of reason, e.g. allowing art or non-linear reasoning to count as argumentation. Finally, some approaches emphasise the role that faculties and capacities such as emotion, embodiment, and imagination play in how we reason.
Does this change the way we ought to understand disagreement, especially the most radical and polarizing disagreements in ethics and politics today? It seems that in addition to the very topics of such disagreements, what lies at the heart of these debates is what it means to reason, or to be a reasoning human being, in the first place. Is it possible to unify these conceptions of reasoning, or can we live with plurality about reasoning? How should we reason and make arguments in light of this plurality? Is reasoning even a shared human activity?
This weekly seminar series held in Michaelmas Term 2026, which culminates in a two-day conference (Save the date February 4-5, 2027), seeks to explore these and other related questions, as part of our ANTITHESES research platform on radical moral disagreements in an age of polarization. It aims to provoke further reflection on how we disagree, whether we disagree badly, and how we can disagree better.
SPEAKERS
Dr Jana Sedlakova, Postdoctoral Researcher, Ethox Centre, University of Oxford.
Dr Michael Wee, Postdoctoral Researcher in Bioethics, Ethox Centre, University of Oxford.
PROGRAMME
Multiple dates in October and November 2026, Mondays, 4-5:30 pm.
The Ethical Stance and Radical Self-reflection
- Date: 19th of October, 4-5:30 pm
- Speaker- Dr Jana Sedlakova
This first session will combine a theoretical talk with a practically oriented session exploring the role of self-reflection and making one’s own ethical stance explicit in moral disagreement and engagement. An ethical stance is understood here as the broader structure within which moral reasoning and argumentation unfold. It includes not only the commitments and values we bring to moral questions, but also less explicit dimensions of our engagement, such as attitudes and emotions. The session will explore how greater awareness of these dimensions might affect how we reason and engage with radically different views on ethical questions.
Action and Embodied Reason
- Date: 26th of October, 4-5:30 pm
- Speaker- Dr Michael Wee
The idea of action as a form of reasoning, or at least an essential part of it, is not new to philosophy. Arguably, Aristotle expresses something of this idea in his account of the practical syllogism, although its interpretation remains much debated. Traditional interpretations of the practical syllogism tend to see action as the mere execution of reasoning, with practical reasoning understood according to the model of theoretical reasoning and its rules of inference. This paper will explore how Anscombe’s account of intentional action and practical knowledge is key to developing a more satisfactory account of moral decision-making. On this account, action is an embodiment of the reasoning process itself. Furthermore, it challenges the dominance of the theoretical model for understanding practical reasoning, suggesting that practical (and moral) reasoning unfolds according to a more creative, narrative-focused standard, rather than one of strict logical inference.
Moral Perception and Moral Reasoning
- Date: 2nd of November, 4-5:30 pm
- Speaker- Dr Michael Wee
Vision and perception are common metaphors in relation to morality, especially in literary as well as political discussions of moral issues, though they have had less success in academic moral philosophy. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s well-known discussions of aspect-perception (such as in the case of the duck-rabbit), this paper will explore how our ability to perceive different aspects in a given situation is key to making progress in unravelling radical moral disagreements.
Embodiment, Mindfulness and Disagreement
- Date: 9th of November, 4-5:30 pm
- Speaker- Dr Jana Sedlakova
The last session will combine a theoretical talk with a practically oriented session exploring complementary skills of mindfulness and embodiment to ethical reasoning. We will focus on the question: what skillsets should ethicists have and in which set of skills should ethical reasoning unfold? Both mindfulness and embodiment invite us to attend not only to what we think, but also to how we experience, respond, and engage with different views and others, opening up new ways of approaching ethical disagreement.
Booking information
The workshops are free to attend and we encourage you to register, so we can keep track of numbers. If you would like to attend, please register via this form.
If you have any questions about the workshops, please get in touch with the organisers by emailing jana.sedlakova@ethox.ox.ac.uk or michael.wee@ethox.ox.ac.uk